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Tibetan Fraternal Polyandry: 
A Review of its Advantages and Breakdown 
·Polyandry is primarily selected 
not for bread and butter motives -
fear of starvation in a difficult 
environment - but rather primarily 
for the Tibetan equivalent of 
oysters, champagne, and social 
esteem.- Melvyn C. Goldstein 
(1978). 
Jeff Willett 
The fraternal polyandry marriage 
relationship of Tibet is widely considered 
to be a means of preventing the division 
of a family's resources among its male 
heirs. As a family resource preservation 
strategy, Tibetan polyandry 
accomplishes the same goal of the 
European stem family system, but in a 
very different way. Researchers have 
suggested that polyandry developed in 
Tibet, because it provides a household 
with enough male laborers to fully 
exploit the marginal agricultural lands in 
the Himalayas, that it serves as a 
means of population control, or that it 
serves as a way of reducing tax 
obligations to feudal Tibetan lords. A 
more convincing explanation why 
Tibetan polyandry is practiced is 
provided by Nancy E. Levine. She 
claims that polyandry provides a 
household with a large labor force, 
enabling the family to pursue 
simultaneous and extensive involvement 
in the three different sectors of the 
Tibetan economy: agriculture, herding, 
and trading (1988). Since Tibetan 
polyandry provides such important 
economic advantages to households, 
one can assume that the reasons for the 
dissolution of polyandrous marriages 
are largely for individual interests. 
Levine (1981) and Melvyn C. Goldstein 
(1981) find that the breakup of 
polyandrous marriages is usually 
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caused by the younger brothers of the 
household, because of unhappiness 
with their spouse, their lower 
reproductive success than older 
brothers, a desire for personal 
autonomy, and difficulty in maintaining a 
large household. Goldstein (1981) also 
finds that brothers are more likely to 
leave polyandrous marriages when 
unexpected economic opportunities 
arise. 
Tibetan Fraternal Polyandry 
Fraternal polyandry is the 
preferred form of marriage among the 
culturally Tibetan villages where Levine 
and Goldstein based their studies. The 
Tibetan's own explanations for the 
practice of polyandry are materialistic. 
They claim that a strategy of fraternal 
polyandry preserves the productive 
resources of their family units across 
generations (Goldstein 1978). 
Throughout pre-Chinese occupied Tibet, 
polyandry was considered the preferred 
form of marriage among agricultural 
upper class peasants, landholding 
aristocrats, and priest households 
(Levine 1988:158). The practice of 
polyandry is so common that in the 
village of Nyinba, landholding 
households with two or more sons enter 
into a polyandrous marriage 100 percent 
of the time (Levine 1988:143). Only 
Nyinba's landless former slaves avoid 
polyandry when there are two or more 
brothers. 
In a polyandrous family, the 
eldest brother is the dominant authority 
member. The eldest brother is 
responsible for finding a wife and for 
making arrangements for bride-price 
and the wedding ceremony. Control of 
the family estate is passed from the 
former household head to the eldest son 
soon after the marriage. As the head of 
the household, the eldest brother is 
considered the final authority in all 
family decision making (Levine 
1988:115). He determines the 
allocation of cash, makes decisions 
about involvement in agriculture, 
herding and trading, and serves as the 
family representative in village political 
gatherings. 
Upon marriage, all of the eldest 
brother's younger brothers (including 
possible unbom brothers) become co-
husbands to the wife. Tibetan society 
stresses sexual access and equity for all 
of the co-husbands once they reach 
maturity (Levine 1988:151). The eldest 
brother generally concedes much of his 
sexual access to the wife once his 
younger brothers mature. Sexual 
preference is also generally shown for 
brothers who have been away from the 
village on trading trips or who have 
taken the herds to distant pasturage 
when they retum to the household 
(Levine 1988:164). 
In Tibetan polyandry, it is 
important for both the wife and the co-
husbands to participate in sexual 
relationships. Wives who deny sexual 
access to their husbands are considered 
troublemakers, threatening the stability 
of the polyandrous union. Husbands 
who refuse to enter into or maintain 
sexual relations with their wives have 
renunciated potential marriage claims 
(Levine 1988:151). 
In addition, brothers in 
polyandrous marriages are expected to 
cooperate in household activities to 
maximize its economic, social, and 
political standing. Brothers often 
specialize in one of the three major 
aspects of Tibetan economy: 
agriculture, herding, and long distance 
trade. The co-husbands are also 
responsible for cooperating with child 
care and household maintenance 
activities. In short, solidarity among the 
brothers is at the core of Tibetan kinship 
ideals (Levine 1988:159). A strong 
undivided household not only leads to 
benefits for the family, it also leads to 
stronger village viability. Stronger 
households are able to meet collective 
obligations such as payment of food 
during public rituals, occasional 
communal labor, better defense of 
infringement on their lands, and 
govemment obligations (Levine 
1988:184). 
Tibetan polyandry leads to more 
powerful households by preventing 
multiple heirs from dividing family 
resources. All male offspring of the 
polyandrous union replicate the 
household structure of their parents 
instead of each brother draining off 
estate resources through monogamous 
marriages. Poor soil fertility, lack of 
irrigation waters, and slope conditions 
are severe constraints to agricultural 
production in the Himalayas (Berreman 
1978). The Tibetan villages studied by 
Levine and Goldstein have opened up 
all possible lands to agricultural 
production. Dividing a household's 
limited agricultural lands among male 
heirs would quickly lead to non-viable 
plot sizes and associated losses in 
economic and social status (Goldstein 
1976). 
Multiple male heirs would also 
split up family herds, making an 
individual family more wlnerable to 
herd depopulation through disease, 
drought, and theft. Luxury items such 
as jewelry, fumiture, saddles, etc. are 
also held intact in polyandrous 
marriages. Stores of these items 
represent a household's savings 
account which can be sold during 
difficult economic times. 
Polyandry and the Stem Family 
Researchers have shown how 
Tibetan polyandry accomplished similar 
goals to the stem family system of 
Europe and Japan (Goldstein 1978, 
Levine 1988). The prevention of 
dividing a family's resources among 
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male heirs was also the goal of pre-
modem European societies. The stem 
family strategy developed in European 
societies had much different 
mechanisms for accomplishing this goal 
than the Tibetan strategy of fratemal 
polyandry. The system kept an estate's 
resources intact by allowing only one 
male child per generation to marry 
(Levine 1988:132). In the stem family 
system, primogeniture or ultimogeniture 
was practiced to pass the family estate 
to only one male offspring. Levine 
outlines the four components of the 
stem family system: 1) Only one person 
assumes headship of the estate, 2) 
Non-successors must seek their living 
elsewhere, 3) Impartible inheritance 
maintains the estate; and 4)The estate 
continues over generations. Tibetan 
polyandry maintains the estate with 
impartible inheritance and helps ensure 
that the estate survives over 
generations,_ but it allows all male 
offspring to share in the economic 
opportunities of the household. 
Robert Netting provides an 
excellent example of the stem family 
system in his study of Torbel, a Swiss 
mountain community (Netting 1981). 
Torbel faces many of the ecological 
constraints faced by the Tibetan 
communities studied by Levine and 
Goldstein. Lack of fertile soils and 
irrigation, high slopes, and rocky soils 
limited the amount of land which could 
be converted to agricultural production. 
These limitations also prevented 
potential heirs from converting "virgin-
lands to agricultural production to 
facilitate the creation of new 
households. 
In Torbel, primogeniture gave 
control of the family estate to the eldest 
son. Unlike the Tibetan system where 
the eldest son gained control of the 
estate upon marriage, residents of 
Torbel were forced to wait as the father 
gradually gave up control of the family 
estate. The father may not give up total 
control of the estate until old age made 
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him unable to manage it effectively. 
This led to lengthy delays to marriage as 
older sons had to wait until they 
controlled enough of the estate to afford 
a family of their own. 
Younger brothers and sisters 
had even more troubles. Netting (1981) 
found high levels of bachelorhood and 
spinsters in the community, many of 
whom were allowed to remain on the 
family estate as laborers. The brothers 
helped out with agricultural activities 
while their sisters often maintained the 
household and cared for elderly parents. 
It was very difficult for younger brothers 
to make a living on their own within the 
community, and in tum, many left the 
village to try and find their fortunes 
elsewhere. 
Explanations for Tibetan Polyandry 
Many researchers have tried to 
determine why Tibetans adopted 
_polyandry, with its possible problems of 
sexual jealousies among co-husbands 
and reduced male fertility, rather than 
the stem family system of European 
communities like Torbel. These 
researchers have suggested that the 
marginal agricultural lands of the 
Himalayas required a number of male 
laborers to provide an adequate 
subsistence base for a household, and 
without this large labor force household 
members would be reduced to 
"beggary-. The benefits of polyandry as 
a means of population control and a way 
to ease the tax burdens of landholding 
households have also been proposed. 
However, none of these explanations 
are sufficiently supported by the Tibetan 
communities in which Levine and 
Goldstein conducted their research. 
Jesuit Ippolito Desideri, who 
lived in Lhasa in the early eighteenth 
century, summed up early opinions on 
the reason for Tibetan polyandry: 
"One reason for this most odius custom 
is the sterility of the soil, and the small 
amount of land that can be cultivated 
owing to the lack of water. The crops 
may suffice if the brothers all live 
together, but if they form separate 
families they would be reduced to 
beggary.w (OeFilippi 1937, cited in 
Goldstein 1978) 
Gerald D. Berreman presents 
infonnation to support this argument 
~1978). Berreman claims that polyandry 
IS a strategy which maximizes the ratio 
of ~ec:>ple to resources. Polyandry 
maxJmlZes the adult labor force in order 
to fully utilize or expand agricultural 
lands. 8erreman contends that this 
large labor force is required in the 
Himalayas where conditions make 
agricultural production very difficult. 
8erreman's argument does not 
fit Tibetan society where women 
represent the majority of agricultural 
labor. Levine notes that males are 
responsible for labor intensive 
agricultural activities such as plOwing, 
planting, building and maintaining 
terrace walls and irrigation systems and 
threshing (Levine 1978:207). Wo~n, 
on the other hand, perfonn tasks which 
are much more time consuming, such 
as clearing fields of stones and brush 
weeding, applying compost, and 
processi.ng foods. As an example, a 
field. which can be planted in one day 
requires from five to sixteen days of 
weeding. The former slaves which were 
kept by Nyinban households were used 
to help with agricultural and domestic 
a~vities a single wife couldn't keep up 
with. With these facts in mind, polygyny 
would appear to be a better strategy 
than polyandry if the goal is to maximize 
agricultural labor in Tibetan societies. 
Goldstein also disagrees with the 
"beggary" argument. Younger brothers 
who split from polyandrous families and 
receive little or no arable lands are able 
to find other ways to make a living and 
are not reduced to beggary (Goldstein 
1978). Labor shortages in Tibet 
provided an economic alternative to 
agriculture, although it was not as 
lucrative as remaining within the 
polyandrous household. Levine's study 
of Nyinba shows that many families can 
utilize additional laborers as shepherds 
or extra hands during peak agricultural 
periods. Throughout history, the 
landless populations of Tibet have 
supported themselves through wage 
labor, craft making, and servitude 
(Goldstein 1978). Brothers leaving 
polyandrous marriages could have 
pursUed any of these activities. 
While there may be economic 
opportunities for brothers who partition 
from polyandrous marriages at the 
individual level, the practice of polyandry 
protects interests at the group level. 
Polyandry has been shown to be an 
effective mechanism for population 
control within Tibetan communities 
(Goldstein 1981, Levine 1988, Crook 
and Crook 1988). Goldstein has shown 
that a shift to monogamy would increase 
the population of one Tibetan 
community by sixteen percent. This 
increase would create major stresses on 
the region's ability to support the 
population (Goldstein 1976). The 
consequent stresses of population 
growth may be enough to reduce the 
majority of the community to poverty 
conditions. Levine supports this by 
showing that residents of Nyinba 
understand the population control 
ben~fits of polyandry (Levine 1988). 
ReSidents of the community discourage 
the breakup of polyandrous marriages, 
because of the strain that monogamous 
marriage and its associated increase in 
population puts on the community as a 
whole. 
Goldstein has also argued that 
the development of polyandry was 
largely the result of tax responsibilities 
to feudal lords (cited in Pasternak 
Ember ~nd Ember 1997). Among th~ 
landholding serfs, feudal obligations 
were imposed on households rather 
tha~ individuals. Through polyandry, a 
family would be able to pool its labor 
and economic resources to satisfy these 
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obligations. If the family were to break 
apart into several smaller units, each 
would have to satisfy the same 
obligations as before with fewer 
resources. Levine says that rather than 
being fooled by this "tax dodging" 
strategy, the Tibetan authorities 
encouraged polyandry among the 
landholding estates as a way of 
maximizing the household's economic 
efficiency (Levine 1988). This in tum led 
to greater stability throughout Tibet and 
more revenue for the govemmenl 
Although this argument may be 
the reason households adopted 
polyandry in the past, it does not explain 
why it continues. The feudal system 
ended well before the Chinese 
occupation of Tibet in the 1950's, yet 
families continued to practice polyandry. 
Levine even found that former slaves 
. who never practiced polyandry in the 
past are beginning to adopt it today 
(Levine 1988). 
Tibetan Polyandry 
and Economic Specialization 
Nancy Levine presents the most 
convincing explanation for the 
development of fratemal polyandry and 
its continued practice in contemporary 
Tibetan society: the ability of 
polyandrous households to maximize 
productivity from the three major 
aspects of the Tibetan economy (Levine 
1988). The Tibetan alpine economy is 
made up of agriculture, long distance 
trading, and herding (in that order of 
importance). Unlike the stem family 
system of Europe in which agriculture 
was the dominant economic activity of 
the stem households, Tibetans can 
pursue one of three economic 
strategies. In Netting's study of Torbel, 
families devoted almost all of their labor 
resources toward agricultural production 
(Netting 1981). Families only kept two 
or three cows to provide dairy products, 
rather than accumulating large herds. 
Few animals required little labor from 
the husband, wife or children. Long 
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distance trading seems to have been 
completely absent from the Torbel 
economy. 
Nancy Levine suggests that 
polyandry is the most effective way for a 
household to juggle agriculture, herding, 
and trade, because it provides a 
household with a large labor force able 
to pursue simultaneous and extensive 
involvement in the different economic 
sectors (Levine 1988:82). In 
polyandrous marriages, brothers are 
able to specialize in one of the three 
economic aspects. This specialization 
is encouraged and leads to greater 
retums for the household (Levine 
1988:237). Larger polyandrous 
households also have greater flexibility 
which can protect them during periods 
of low retum in one of the three areas. 
As an example, Levine describes how 
many polyandrous households were 
able to invest more resources in long 
distance trade during periods of 
declining agricultural yields in the early 
eighties. Brothers, rather than hired 
'laborers, are the only individuals who 
can be entrusted with estate resources. 
This trust is especially important in long 
distance trade where men take a great 
deal of the household's resources and 
are away from the community for much 
of the year. It is interesting to note that 
Nyinban society does not allow non-
fratemal polyandry, which may be the 
result of the inefficiencies and mistrust 
of these relationships. 
In the Tibetan region, each major 
component of the economy offers a 
viable source of income, but agriculture 
is the central fixture of Tibetan life both 
economically and symbolically (Levine 
1988). An estate's first priority is to 
productively utilize its agricultural lands 
to satisfy subsistence needs. As 
mentioned earlier, women supply the 
majority of agricultural labor throughout 
much of the year. Men, however, are 
responsible for labor intensive activities 
during peak periods of the agricultural 
cycle. Male labor is required from 
March, when the fields are prepared for 
the year's first millet crops, to 
December, when bariey is sown. During 
this time men are responsible for sOwing 
all of the family's crops, for construction 
of walls and . irrigation canals, and for 
irrigating the fields. 
Uke the Swiss community of 
Torbel, Tibetans follow a strategy which 
utilizes' the miao-niches of alpine 
agriculture. An estate's agriO"lItural 
plots are generally widely dispersed, 
often miles from the house, in order to 
capitalize on variations of sunlight, 
rainfall, and soils. These variations 
permit a wider variety of crops to be 
grown and helps reduce the risk of crop 
failures due to climatic shocks. 
Because of limitations of soil quality, 
slope, etc., the plots are rarely larger 
than one quarter of an acre. This leads 
to problems of dis-economies of scale 
(Levine 1988:211). The small, widely 
dispersed plots lead to a great deal of 
travel time each day for both men and 
women who need to work in several 
fields. It also means that a man may 
spend most of one month traveling to 
each small plot of land to plant that 
season's crop. This activity could be 
finished in a couple of days if the plots 
were consolidated. 
A household's dietary success is 
often related to how well it can fully 
exploit each small plot of land. Nyinban 
households which understand the 
diversity of the miao-niches are able to 
grow vegetables such as turnips, 
potatoes, peas, cucumbers, pumpkin, 
and squash (Levine 1988:214). These 
households have a wider diversity in 
diet, and probably exhibit better health. 
Small amounts of soybeans, amaranth, 
lentils, and kidney beans are also 
produced by the more adept 
agriculturists and are used primarily for 
trading. Households which lack this 
agricultural fmesse are limited to 
producing the staple crops of 
buckwheat, barley, millet and radishes. 
In contrast to agriculture, herding 
is the least desirable aspect of the 
Tibetan economy. Wealthy families 
often hire men to maintain their herds or 
give the task to an otherwise 
uunproductive" brother (Levine 
1988:226). Owning herds provides 
several resources for Tibetan 
households: manure, butter, milk, meat, 
and pack animals for long distance 
trading. Despite its benefits, the risk of 
herding makes it less attractive than 
agricultural production. Residents of 
Umi told Melvyn Goldstein Uland doesn't 
die the way animals do" (1978). 
Males are responsible for the 
majority of animal husbandry activities, 
other than the preparation and 
application of manure to the fields. 
Levine stresses the importance Nyinba 
agriculturists place on applying manure 
to fields. This strategy helps replenish 
nutrients of double cropped and 
marginal soils. Levine says that 
Nyinban households which cannot 
afford herds of their own collect manure 
left on the roads. In order to gain 
access to as much manure as possible, 
wealthy families without labor to spare 
for herding hire men to take care of their 
herds. 
Animal husbandry also provides 
a very important component of Tibetan 
diet and culture - butter. Butter is often 
required for many civil and religious 
celebrations, especially weddings. The 
average yak produces eight kilograms of 
butter each summer. Nyinban 
households keep around two kilograms 
for their personal consumption and use 
the rest as a trading commodity. The 
widespread lack of butter in other parts 
of Tibet and Nepal make it one of the 
most profitable trade goods for 
households. Obviously, the more 
livestock a household has the more 
butter is available for trade. 
Households which are able to 
maintain larger herds have more access 
to both milk and meat, and have greater 
diversity in diet. Milk and meat 
consumption is highest during the 
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autumn and winter. In the autumn, 
traders retum with sheep obtained in 
Tibet and several are usually 
slaughtered for celebrations. In the 
winter months, pasture lands are scarce 
and cattle are kept near the village and 
fed hay. During this time it is much 
easier to provide a household with milk. 
Herding also provides pack 
animals for the last aspect of Tibetan 
economy, long distance trading. Long 
distance trade appears to have figured 
in the Tibetan-Nepalese economy for 
centuries (Levine 1988:215). It serves 
as the only way for relatively isolated 
and environmentally restricted 
Himalayan communities to gain access 
to a wide variety of resources. Although 
trading can be the most lucrative aspect 
of the economy, it is almost necessarily 
the last avenue pursued. Households 
must first focus on agriculture and then 
build up a sizable number of available 
pack animals before being able to enter 
. into trading. Since the second or third 
brother can engage in long distance 
trading, it is a luxury that polyandry and 
its co-resident male laborers make 
attainable. 
Trading is virtually a year round 
occupation which is performed 
exclusively by males. In Nyinba, the 
trading season begins in June when 
men travel into Tibet and acquire salt 
with the promise that it will be paid for 
with grain after the harvest. Until 
November, the traders remain near the 
Humla valley where they trade salt and 
other goods such as cattle, butter, and 
wool. In December, the traders 
generally return to Nyinba with 
provisions for weddings before heading 
south for the winter salt trade. The 
winter journey takes the traders across 
Nepal to the border of India where they 
trade salt for rice. Travel is slow as the 
traders take advantage of available 
grazing lands during the journey. 
Finally, in May the men retum from the 
south with rice to provision another 
series of weddings and celebrations. 
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After a month of rest, the trading season 
begins again. 
Trading, as opposed to 
agriculture and herding, directly benefits 
from each additional labor input. The 
more pack animals a household can 
load with trade goods the greater their 
retums can be. Similar1y, the more 
villages a trading group can reach the 
greater the retums. Additional males 
help control larger herd sizes and allow 
the trading group to split up to reach 
different communities. While there is a 
clear relationship between the number 
of traders and profits, success in trading 
also depends largely on the skills and 
interests of the individual men (Levine 
1988:222). 
Participation in trading allows 
households to actiieve what Goldstein 
(1978) describes as the "Tibetan 
equivalent of oysters, champagne, and 
social esteem.· Successful traders 
bring home tremendous amounts of 
food which improve their diet and can be 
used to sponsor lavish feasts. On the 
trade routes, wealthy households are 
able to purchase high status jewelry, 
manufactured goods, and clothing 
items. Households which don't engage 
in trade suffer from diminished social 
status. These estates cannot sponsor 
feasts and must borrow or buy rice for 
weddings and funerals. Households 
with similar landholdings and agricultural 
production will have very different 
economic standings if one engages in 
trade and the other does not (Levine 
1988:223). 
Long distance trade readily 
accommodates changes in household 
size. Households may enter and leave 
trading from generation to generation 
depending on the availability of male 
labor (Levine 1988:224). In this way, 
trading is ideally suited to a polyandrous 
household system. It is easy to sell off 
excess animals when male labor is 
lacking and purchase them when more 
males are available. Land, on the other 
hand, is almost never bought and sold 
making agricuJturai expansion nearly 
impossible. 
Trade is also very adaptable to 
changing economic conditions. After 
the Chinese occupation of Tibet, 
Nyinba traders were unable to cross the 
border to trade for the salt necessary for 
the rice trade in the south. During this 
period of reduced trading opportunities, 
households focused more heavily on 
agricultural production and animal 
husbandry. When trade in Tibet was 
made possible again, households 
quickly reorganized to accommodate the 
salt-grain trade. The opposite occurred 
in the early 1980's when a series of bad 
harvests devastated agricultural 
production and households had a 
greater reliance on long distance trade 
for food needs. 
The interrelationships between 
the three aspects of the Tibetan 
economy suggest why polyandry is the 
favored form of household organization. 
With three or more brothers, 
polyandrous households are able to 
specialize in each of the three economic 
sectors and pool their resources for the 
benefit of the estate. In alpine 
agriculture, with its microniche 
environments, this specialization is 
critical. Households which are able to 
fully utilize their plots to grow trade 
goods such as lentils and soybeans are 
contributing to an increase in overall 
socio-economic status. Having a full 
time animal husbandry specialist is also 
important. A specialist maximizes the 
number and quality of livestock. As a 
result, a household will have more butter 
and wool available for trade and will be 
able to contribute more meat to 
community feasts. Trade requires an 
almost year round commitment and 
specialized skills in bargaining and 
managing pack animals. 
The Partition 
of Polyandrous Marriages 
Polyandry seems to provide 
Tibetan households with a number of 
benefits. First of all, it prevents the 
division of the family estate similar to the 
stem family system of Europe. Unlike 
the stem family system, polyandry 
allows a household to maximize its 
involvement in the three aspects of the 
Tibetan economy. This in tum leads to 
greater social and political status for the 
household members. Polyandry also 
provides a flexible system that can shift 
its resources to adjust to major 
economic and environmental changes. 
Despite all of these benefits, 
some brothers in polyandrous marriages 
choose to leave the marriage and try to 
make it on their own. Generally, it is the 
younger brothers who are responsible 
for the break up of polyandrous 
marriages (Levine and Silk 1997). 
Clearly, there are situations in which 
individual interests outweigh the desire 
to maintain the family estate and its 
associated socio-economic benefits. 
Levine and Goldstein offer several 
conditions which may lead a younger 
brother to break up a polyandrous 
marriage including the conflicts of a 
large household, lower reproductive 
success, less personal autonomy, a lack 
of satisfaction with an older wife, and 
new economic opportunities. 
In a study of the Nyinba 
community, Nancy Levine and Joan Silk 
found that the probability of brothers 
partitioning from polyandrous marriages 
increases in households with more male 
siblings (1997). Marriages with four 
husbands ended in partition 58% of the 
time, those with three husbands 
partitioned 25% of the time, and 
households with two husbands 
partitioned only 10% of the time. 
Households which partitioned had an 
average of 3.9 brothers, while those 
which remained intad had an average 
of 2.9 brothers. Levine and Silk believe 
that larger marital units may be more 
prone to internal conflicts. All of the 
brothers must cooperate together and 
maintain an effective relationship for the 
marriage to last. With a greater number 
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of personalities in the household, 
cooperative relationships become more 
difficult They also cite sociobiological 
explanations which state that a greater 
number of co-husbands leads to a 
further reduction of a male's 
reproductive opportunities. Finally, 
sexual jealousy may also lead to greater 
conflicts with more males competing for 
the same wife. 
Levine and Silk (1997) also cite 
the influence of age differences between 
husbands and wives in the partitioning 
of polyandrous marriages. Elder 
brothers generally marry at age 20, and 
they find a wife an average of 3.8 years 
younger than themselves. Typically, all 
other brothers are younger than their 
wife. The third brother is typically seven 
years younger than the wife, and the 
fourth brother is typically ten years 
younger. This disparity in age between 
the brothers and the wife is directly 
related to the partitioning of the 
marriages. The younger a brother is 
than his wife, the more likely he is to 
initiate the partition of the marriage. 
Levine and Silk (1997) suggest 
that men married to older women may 
find them to be less physically attractive, 
less satisfying sexually, and less 
satisfying companions. The researchers 
show that men who arrange new 
marriages after leaving the polyandrous 
union almost always many a woman 
younger than their first wife. On 
average men forming new marriages 
leave wives 5.7 years older, and many 
women 3.6 years younger than 
themselves. 
Levine also shows that wives 
often take an active role in raising their 
younger husbands (1988). The 
Westermark effect may have a strong 
influence on the dissatisfaction of the 
marriage. Younger brothers may view 
their wife as more of a mother or sister 
figure than a spouse, and therefore, will 
be unsatisfied with the marriage. 
Levine describes how wives may 
tease or even abuse their younger 
104 
husbands (1988). Often when the 
younger brothers complain, they are told 
that the wife is just molding them 
according to her desires, and when they 
grow up they will be her favorites. 
Despite this possibility, younger 
husbands may resent their wife's 
abuses or feel uncomfortable around 
her after years of teaSing. 
Disparity in age between 
husbands and wives is directly related to 
the birth order of the husbands. Since 
authority in polyandrous marriages rests 
with the eldest brother, the youngest 
brothers would have a difficult time 
pursuing any of their own interests. The 
elder brother often determines how they 
will serve the household, and what 
economic tasks they will undertake. 
Free-spirited younger brothers may 
prefer to escape from the control of their 
older brothers and fend for themselves 
outside the estate. Levine and Silk 
(1997) found that second brothers 
initiated 22% of partitions and conjoint 
marriages, and men bom later in the 
birth order initiated around 38%. 
Levine and Silk (1997) also cite 
the lower reproductive success of the 
younger husbands as a reason for 
leaving the polyandrous marriage. In 
Nyinban society, determination of 
patemity is critical to membership in the 
kinship system (Levine 1988:38). It is 
usually the wife's responsibility to 
determine the patemity of her children 
and she uses a number of methods for 
this. First, Nyinban women believe they 
are most fertile during the second week 
of their menstrual cycle. The man who 
has intercourse with her during this time 
is the prime candidate for being the 
father. Long distance trading, and travel 
to distant pasturelands also limits the 
possibilities of certain husbands having 
fathered the children. Finally, the 
physical appearance of the child can 
determine its patemity, it is even 
possible for the society at large to 
change the patemity designations of 
children if their appearance resembles a 
different husband. 
At the beginning of the marriage, 
the eldest brother has an obvious 
reproductive advantage over his 
younger, less mature siblings. Levine 
and Silk (1997) found that 67% of first 
born children of the polyandrous 
marriage were attributed to the eldest 
brother. The eldest brother had also 
produced more children than any other 
brother prior to the termination of 
polyandrous marriages. Men who 
actively pursued the partition of the 
marriage produced .04 children per year 
of marriage after their 18th birthdays. 
Men who remained in the marriages 
produced an average of .1 children per 
year. 
Levine and Silk (1997) suggest 
that younger brothers may be denied 
sexual access to the wife by their older 
brothers. This follows sociobiological 
motives that encourage males to 
maximize their own fitness. The 
researchers also suggest that younger 
brothers may deliberately avoid sexual 
relations with the wife to facilitate their 
eventual split from the household. This 
makes economic sense because males 
who father sons with the common wife 
are required to leave a share of his 
property behind for them. 
Another explanation may come 
from the economic roles pursued by the 
brothers in polyandrous marriages. 
Since agricultural production is the first 
economic sector to be explOited and has 
the highest status, it is likely that the 
elder brother is generally in charge of it. 
The importance of economic 
specialization has been mentioned. 
Thus, it would be reasonable that 
younger brothers would focus on the 
trading or herding sectors. Both herding 
and trading require men to be absent 
from the community for extended 
periods of time. If the elder brothers 
remain in the household year round to 
engage in agricultural activities, they 
would have greater sexual access to the 
wife. 
Melvyn Goldstein stresses that 
polyandrous marriages are more likely 
to split when brothers are presented 
with profitable economic alternatives 
(1978). During the Chinese occupation 
of Tibet in 1959, thousands of refugees 
left Tibet and fled to India and Nepal. 
Many of the pastoral nomads of the 
Lake Manasarawa region of Tibet fled 
into Umi. Umi is at the end of the alpine 
steppe ecozone which was necessary to 
support the nomad's sheep and yak 
herds. Unable to take them any further, 
the nomads were forced to sell their 
herds to Umi households at a very 
cheap price or abandon them 
completely. The sudden abundance of 
livestock encouraged the fission of 
polyandrous households by many 
younger brothers during this time. 
After the border of Tibet was 
opened once again to Umi traders, the 
Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal 
offered a large market for trade. Tibetan 
jewelry, crafts, and wooden eating and 
drinking bowls were in high demand 
among the refugees. Umi traders were 
able to make a large profit with very little 
economic investment during this trade. 
This too has led to an increase in the 
frequency in marriage partitions by 
younger brothers who could maintain 
their socio-economic status outside the 
polyandrous marriage by relying solely 
on trade. 
Males, who decide to fission 
from polyandrous marriages because of 
personal interests, often find it 
impossible to survive only on their share 
of the estate's resources (Levine 1988). 
While Tibetan law ensures that each 
brother will gain an equal share of the 
estate if they decide to partition, this is 
usually not the case. Leaving a 
polyandrous marriage is a risky 
undertaking, because the partitioning 
males have no idea exactly how much 
of the estate they will eventually receive 
(Levine and Silk 1997). The elder 
brother, who wishes to see the 
polyandrous marriage remain intad and 
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is supported by the community as a 
while, decides what resources the 
partitioner will take with him (Levine 
1988). Partitioners may be given the 
worst agricultural la1ds or older, less 
valuable animals. The family may also 
decide that the partitioner only has 
rights to an equal share of his father's 
lands, an amount which is much smaller 
than a share of the estate as a whole. 
As a final deterrent to partitioning, males 
are required to leave portions of their 
shares behind for any sons they have 
fathered in the marriage. 
Conclusion 
While Tibetan polyandry and the 
European stem family system 
accomplish the same goals of 
preventing the division of a family 
estate, they do so in very different ways. 
Traditional explanations for Tibetan 
polyandry describe it as a way that a 
household can provide enough male 
laborers for agricultural production, that 
a population can be controlled, or that 
tax obligations can be accomodated for 
the feudal lords. The Tibetan 
communities studied by Nancy Levine 
and Melvyn Goldstein do not adequately 
support any of these explanations. A 
better explanation comes from Nancy 
Levine who shows that polyandry allows 
Tibetan households to fully capitalize on 
the three elements of the Himalayan 
economy: agriculture, herding, and 
trading. A household's participation in 
these three sectors leads to an increase 
in social, political and economic status. 
While Tibetan fratemal polyandry 
provides increased benefits at the 
household level, many younger brothers 
opt to leave the marriage and try to 
make it on their own. Nancy Levine and 
Joan Silk show that younger brothers 
are often unhappy with their older 
spouse, their lower reproductive 
success, and their diminished personal 
autonomy. Melvyn Goldstein also 
suggests that economic opportunities 
requiring little investment, such as the 
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availability of cheap livestock or 
lucrative trading opportunities, will 
encourage brothers to split from 
polyandrous marriages and the family 
estate. 
Finally, it is clear that when the 
economic opportunities which Goldstein 
describes do not become available, 
forming a new household can be very 
risky for partitioning males. Despite 
having the right to an equal share of the 
family estate, they are often given 
smaller or less productive shares of the 
estate's resources. These brothers 
have few legal options for obtaining 
larger or more productive shares 
because the community often views 
their actions as a threat to community 
stability. 
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